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Resolving the "Star Wars"/ABM Treaty Dispute:
May the Source Be With You, President Reagan.
On May 26, 1972, President Richard M. Nixon and Soviet General
Secretary Leonid I. Brezhnev signed the Treaty on the Limitation of
Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems [hereinafter ABM Treaty or Treaty].,
Today, sixteen years after this historic signing in Moscow, a dispute
over the intended meaning of the Treaty rages in Washington,
Moscow, and Geneva. After thirteen years of agreement as to the
meaning of the Treaty,2 the Reagan administration set off an inter-
national furor when it "announced" that a new interpretation of the
Treaty was wholly justified.3 The change created such a stir that
within one week, the administration reversed itself and reaffirmed
the longstanding interpretation of the Treaty [hereinafter "Traditional
Interpretation"1.4 However, the administration expressed its belief
that the new interpretation was justified.5
The underlying policy for the new interpretation Was President
Reagan's desire to accelerate a research program known as the
Strategic Defense Initiative [hereinafter "SDI"]. 6 Because this pro-
gram is envisioned as providing the United States with a space-based
defense against incoming hostile missiles, SDI has been dubbed "Star
Wars." Under the longstanding interpretation of the ABM Treaty,
research into a program such as SDI would be permitted, but any
1. Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republic on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, May 26, 1972,
23 U.S.T. 3435, T.I.A.S. No 7503 [hereinafter ABM Treaty].
2. ABM Treaty Interpretation Dispute: Hearing Before the Subcommittee
on Arms Control, International Security and Science of the House Committee on
Foreign Affairs, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. p.23 (statement by Gerard C. Smith, former
Chief of United States Delegation to the ABM Treaty Negotiations, before the
House of Representatives Subcommittee on Arms Control, International Security
and Science) [hereinafter 1985 Interpretation Dispute Hearing].
3. The new interpretation was first made public by then National Security
Advisor Robert C. McFarlane on October 6, 1985, during the course of a television
interview. See Oberdorfer, White House Revises Interpretation of ABM Treaty,
Washington Post, Oct. 9, 1985, at A21, col. 1.
4. 1985 Interpretation Dispute Hearing, supra note 2, at 1.
5. Id.
6. See generally Bundy, Kennan, McNamara and Smith, The President's
Choice: Star Wars or Arms Control, 63 Foreign Affairs 264 (1984-85); Chayes and
Chayes, Commentary, 99 HAv. L. R.nv. 1956, 1957 (1986) [hereinafter Chayes
Commentary].
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development, testing or deployment of the system would be prohib-
ited.
7
The Reagan administration and advocates of the new "broader"
interpretation [hereinafter "Reinterpretation"] argue that the Tradi-
tional Interpretation is overly restrictive.' Advocates of the Reinter-
pretation point to langauge in the Treaty which, they assert, prohibits
only the actual deployment of a space-based ABM system.9 Adherence
to the Reinterpretation would permit advanced development and
testing of a space-based system without amending the Treaty.
While President Reagan states that SDI is presently in conformance
with the Treaty,l0 high ranking officials of his administration continue
7. For detailed analyses of the Traditional Interpretation of the ABM Treaty,
see Chayes Commentary, supra note 6; a report delivered to the United States Senate
by Senator Sam Nunn, 133 Cong. S2967 (March 11, 1987) [hereinafter Nunn Report];
and Sherr, A Legal Analysis of the 'New Interpretation' of the Anti-Ballistic Missile
Treaty, Lawyers Alliance for Nuclear Arms Control Inc. (1986) [hereinafter Sherr
Analysis]. The Traditional Interpretation will be discussed in further detail in this
comment. The advocates of the Traditional Interpretation rely upon Article V of
the Treaty as proof that the ABM Treaty prohibits development and deployment of
a space-based defense system such as SDI. Article V provides in pertinent part that
"[e]ach party undertakes not to develop, test, or deploy ABM systems or components
which are sea-based, air-based, space-based or mobile land-based." ABM Treaty,
supra note 1, art. V(1), 23 U.S.T., at 3441, T.I.A.S. No. 6503, at 7.
8. A primary advocate of the Reinterpretation is Abraham D. Sofaer, Legal
Advisor, United States Department of State. Judge Sofaer's position is found in his
statement to the House Subcommittee on Arms Control, International Security and
Science, 1985 Interpretation Dispute Hearing, supra note 2, at 9, and Sofaer, The
ABM Treaty and the Strategic Defense Initiative, 99 HARv. L. REv. 1974 (1986).
[hereinafter Sofaer Commentary].
9. Advocates of the Reinterpretation rely upon Agreed Statement D as the
foundation of their argument. This statement provides as follows:
In order to insure fulfillment of the obligation not to deploy ABM systems
and their components except as provided in Article III of the Treaty, the
Parties agree that in the event ABM systems based on other physical principles
and including components capable of substituting for ABM interceptor missiles,
ABM launchers, or ABM radars are created in the future, specific limitations
on such systems and their components would be subject to discussion in
accordance with Article XIII and agreement in accordance with Article XIV
of the Treaty.
ABM Treaty, supra note 1, Agreed Statement D. 23 U.S.T., at 3456, T.I.A.S. No.
7503, at 22.
Agreed Statement D, along with other Agreed Statements, Common Under-
standings and Unilateral Statements, was added to the Treaty following the signatures
of President Nixon and General Secretary Brezhnev. This addendum was initialed
by the head of each country's negotiating delegation.
10. President Ronald Reagan, Report on Reykjavik, U.S. Dept. of State,
Bureau of Public Affairs, Current Policy No. 875, 1 (1986) [hereinafter Report on
Reykjavik].
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to argue for acceptance of a new broader interpretation."
The dispute over the ABM Treaty interpretation presents intricate
and complex legal, political, and constitutional issues. 12 Several recent
events can be directly attributed to differences over the interpretation.
The dispute is partially responsible for the abrupt conclusion of the
Reykjavik summit in October 1986 between President Reagan and
Soviet General Secretary Mikhail S. Gorbachev." Secretary Gor-
bachev also threatened to cancel the December 1987 Reagan-Gor-
bachev summit because of the dispute.'
4
In addition, the Treaty interpretation became a bargaining chip in
Geneva, Switzerland, where the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces
Treaty [hereinafter "INF Treaty"] was recently completed. 5 At the
same time, resolutions were introduced in the United States Senate
by Senators Biden, Levin, and Nunn which would prevent the Reagan
administration from implementing its Reinterpretation without the
consent of Congress.'
6
This comment will delve into the legal and constitutional issues
underlying the interpretation dispute. Part I will compare and contrast
both interpretations of the ABM Treaty, 7 including the Soviet view
11. See Perle, The Political Trials of SDI, U.S. News and World Report
(Sept. 14, 1987), reprinted in 133 Cong. Rec. No. 143, E3616-17; Secretary of State
George Schultz, Reykjavik: A Watershed in United States - Soviet Relations, U.S.
Dept. of State, Burearu of Public Affairs, Current Policy No. 883, 5 (1986)
[hereinafter Schultz Report]; and, Paul H. Nitze, Special Adviser to the President
and the Secretary of State on Arms Control Matters, Permitted and Prohibited
Activities Under the ABM Treaty, U.S. Dept of State, Bureau of Public Affairs,
Current Policy No. 886 (1986) [hereinafter Nitze Article].
12. For a thoughtful and comprehensive discussion of these issues see Nunn
Report, supra note 7.
13. Schultz Report, supra note 11.
14. Markham, Schultz Declares Missile Pact Needs No Summit Meeting, N.Y.
Times, Oct. 25, 1987, at Al, col. 6.
15. Krauthammer, The Senate's Meddling is Hurting the President and the
Nation, syndicated column, reprinted in Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, Oct. 13, 1987, at
All, col. 1.
16. Gordon, Senate Committee Threatens Delay of New Arms Pact, N.Y.
Times, Sept. 21, 1987, at A6, col. 1. From Senator Nunn's statements before the
Senate, one can induce that the rationale behind these resolutions lies with the
Senate's constitutional power of advice and consent in the area of treaty ratification.
See infra note 18 and accompanying text. As will be discussed infra at notes 126-
55, since the Senate ratified the ABM Treaty based upon the Traditional Interpre-
tation, Senator Nunn argues that any change in the interpretation would require the
Senate to develop an "appropriate response." Nunn Report, supra note 7, at S2973.
17. Opponents of SDI argue that it also violates the Outer Space Treaty of
1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410, T.I.A.S. No. 6347, 610 U.N.T.S. 205. The scope of this
19881
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of the Treaty. Part II will analyze the dispute from the vantage point
of international law and treaty interpretation principles. Part III will
focus on the constitutional implications behind the dispute as they
relate to the Senate's role of advice and consent in the treaty
ratification process.18
I. DrFFERENCES OVER THE Treaty's MEANING' 9
A. The Interpretation Dispute
The central focus of public debate surrounding the interpretation
of the Treaty is the exact limitation which the Treaty places on the
development of SDI. According to those who espouse the Traditional
Interpretation, SDI is permitted under the Treaty as long as the
program is confined to research. 20 Advocates of the Reinterpretation
argue that the Treaty prohibits only the actual deployment of a
mobile space-based defense program such as SDI. 2'
As one might expect in an interpretation dispute, both sides differ
over the meaning and usage of a few words and phrases. The meaning
attributed to those words and phrases have the effect of changing
the relevance of entire articles and statements contained in the Treaty.
At the risk of appearing overly simplistic, the dispute boils down
to the issue of whether the Treaty was intended to apply only to
comment is limited to the legality of SDI vis a vis the ABM Treaty. For an analysis
of the Outer Space Treaty in general see Vlasic, Disarmament Decade, Outer Space
and International Law, McGML-L.J. 136, 167 (1981). Regarding the application of
the Outer Space Treaty to SDI, see Note, The Legality of President Reagan's
Proposed Space-Based Missile Defense System, 14 GA. J. OF INT'L. & COMIP. LAW
329, 343 (1984).
18. Article II, section 2 of the Constitution of the United States provides
that the President "shall have power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the
Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur." U.S.
Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
19. In order to give the reader some idea of the chasm between both sides
of this dispute, it is necessary to point out that there is disagreement over how each
interpretation is classified. Those who advocate the Reagan administration's position
refer to the longstanding interpretation as the "restrictive interpretation," while
classifying their new reading of the Treaty as the "broad interpretation." Presum-
ably, such a classification relates to the scope of future development permitted by
the Treaty and not to the mind set of the interpreter. On the other hand, those
who advocate the longstanding interpretation refer to their reading of the Treaty as
the "Traditional Interpretation." This side of the dispute classifies the Reagan
administration's position as the "Reinterpretation."
20. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
21. See supra notes 8 and 9 and accompanying text.
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technology existing in 1972 or whether the parties contemplated that
the Treaty would apply to future technologies. A phrase used regu-
larly in this regard during the course of the public debate is whether
the Treaty applies to "exotics.
' 22
The analyses and debates on this issue have focused primarily on
four sections of the Treaty. Article II(1) defines an ABM system for
purposes of the Treaty.23 Article III contains specific limitations on
either country's ability to deploy ABM systems. 24 Article V(l) pro-
hibits both countries from developing, testing, or deploying ABM
systems which are sea-based, air-based, space-based, or mobile land-
based. 2  Agreed Statement D relates specifically to future ABM
systems .26
1. Articles II and V
The crux of the dispute revolves around the use of the phrase
"currently consisting of: (a) ABM interceptor missiles... ; (b) ABM
launchers. . . ; and (c) ABM radars . . ." in Article 11(1) to define
an ABM system. Focus is primarily centered upon the use of the
word "currently."
Those who favor the Traditional Interpretation argue that "cur-
rently" followed by the three ABM components was used for merely
22. See Nunn Report, supra note 7, at S2970-71; Sofaer Commentary, supra
note 8, at 1972. Depending upon the interpretation to which one subscribes,
"exotics" can mean "ballistic missile defense devices based on physical principles
other than those in use when the Treaty was signed," (the Reinterpretation approach
as found in Sofaer Commentary, id. at 1972, n.3) or "future systems" (the
Traditional Interpretation approach as found in Chayes Commentary, supra note 6,
at 1964).
23. Article 11(l) provides that "[flor the purpose of this Treaty an ABM
system is a system to counter strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight
trajectory, currently consisting of, (a) ABM interceptor missiles... ; (b) ABM
launchers... ; and (c) ABM radars . . . ." ABM Treaty, supra note 1, Art. II, 23
U.S.T., at 3439, T.I.A.S. No. 7503, at 5 (emphasis added).
24. Article III as originally signed permitted each country to deploy two fixed
land-based ABM systems. ABM Treaty, supra note 1, Art. III, 23 U.S.T., at 3440,
T.I.A.S. No. 7503, at 6. A subsequent Protocol signed by President Nixon and
General Secretary Brezhnev reduced the number of fixed land-based sites from two
to one. Sherr, Legal Issues of the "Star Wars" Defense Program, Lawyers Alliance
for Nuclear Arms Control, Inc., 2 (1984).
The U.S.S.R. has deployed an ABM system in the proximity of Moscow as is
permitted by Article III. The United States has yet to deploy a fixed land-based
ABM system. Report on Reykjavik, supra note 10, at 1.
25. See supra note 7.
26. See supra note 9.
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illustrative purposes. 27 According to the Traditional Interpretation,
the short list of components was not intended to limit the definition
of an ABM system to those three components which existed in 1972.28
The argument continues that Article II is a functional definition-
that is, it defines prohibited ABM systems in terms of their perform-
ance and not in terms of technology.
29
To support their use of the word "currently", proponents of the
Traditional Interpretation rely upon an explanatory statement made
by Dr. Raymond Garthoff, the Executive Secretary and Senior Ad-
visor of the United States delegation which negotiated the Treaty.a0
According to Dr. Garthoff, "the word 'currently' was deliberately
inserted into a previously adopted text of Article II at the time
agreement was reached on the future systems ban (Agreed Statement
D) in order to have the very effect of closing a loophole to the ban
on futures in both Articles III and V.
' ' 3
1
Advocates of the Reinterpretation argue that the Article II defi-
nition of ABM systems is one of limitation. 2 Under this rationale,
the framers of the Treaty did not intend for Article I to apply to
systems based on future technologies. Rather, the three ABM com-
ponents were listed as they were for the purpose of limiting the scope
of the definition to ABM systems in use at the time the Treaty was
signed." It follows, under this line of reasoning, that Agreed State-
ment D was inserted to regulate future systems based on "other
physical principles" .
4
If the Article II definition was designed to limit ABM systems to
technology existing in 1972, then Article V takes on an entirely
different meaning, proponents of the Reinterpretation assert. 5 The
Article V prohibition against development, testing, and deployment
of all ABM systems except fixed land-based systems, therefore, would
27. Chayes Commentary, supra note 6, at 1958.
28. Id.
29. Id. Professors Chayes offer as support for this argument a report by
then Secretary of State William Rogers. See 67 Dept. of State Bull. 3 (1972). In
this report, Secretary Rogers states that Article 11(1) defines ABM systems in terms
of their function. Id. at 6.
30. Chayes Commentary, supra note 6, at 1959.
31. Id., (citing INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, Summer 1977, at 107, 108.)
See also Sherr Analysis, supra note 7, at 6.
32. See Sofaer Commentary, supra note 8, at 1974; Nitze Article, supra note
11, at 2.
33. Sofaer Commentary, supra note 8, at 1974.
34. Id. at 1975.
35. Id. at 1974.
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apply only to the 1972-era ABM systems, i.e., ABM interceptor
missiles, ABM launchers, and ABM radars.
36
On the other hand, if the Article II definition was intended to
apply to 1972-era and future ABM systems as the Traditionalists
argue, Article V is clear and unambiguous."7 Read as such, Article
V would ban the development, testing, and deployment of all space-
based systems regardless of whether they were constructed of 1972
technology or of other physical principles.
38
In his argument against the Traditional Interpretation, Judge Abra-
ham D. Sofaer, Legal Adviser to the State Department, asserts that
Agreed Statement D is the only provision of the Treaty which
addresses "other physical principles", i.e., technologies not used in
systems defined in the Treaty.3 9 This is directly related to his conten-
tion that the Article V prohibitions relate only to technologies avail-
able in 1972 and that future technologies do not come within the
ambit of the Treaty.4
However, this assertion is refuted by a written reply by then
Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird to a question raised by Senator
Barry Goldwater during a Senate hearing on the military implications
of the ABAI Treaty.4' Secretary Laird's reply clearly indicated that
an "exotic" device such as a laser was contemplated when the Treaty
was negotiated, vis a vis the use of lasers in fixed land-based systems. 42
This reply by Secretary Laird directly sets forth the Traditional
Interpretation of the Treaty. Even Judge Sofaer acknowledges that
Secretary Laird's statement is supportive of the Traditional Interpre-
tation.43 As will be discussed subsequently in this comment, such a
36. Id.
37. Chayes Commentary, supra note 6, at 1959.
38. Id. at 1961.
39. Sofaer Commentary, supra note 8, at 1972-73.
40. Id.
41. See Chayes Commentary, supra note 6, at 1960, and Nunn Report, supra
note 7, at S2977 (both citing Military Implications of the Treaty on Limitations of
Strategic Offensive Arms: Hearing before the Senate Committee on Armed Services,
92nd Cong., 2nd Sess. 40-41 (1972)).
42. Nunn Report, supra note 7, at S2977. Senator Nunn's report also contains
extensive testimony taken from the transcript of the Senate Military Implication
Hearings. This testimony amply supports Senator Nunn's assertion that the ABM
Treaty consented to by the Senate in 1972 was a treaty based upon the Traditional
Interpretation. That is, that certain key Senators understood that development,
testing, and deployment of space-based "exotics" was prohibited by the Treaty. Id.
at S2976-81.
43. Sofaer Commentary, supra note 8, at 1982 n.28.
19881
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formal statement by a high-ranking official of the Nixon administra-
tion is especially noteworthy. Under precepts of international law,
statements made by government officials in high positions have had
precedential and binding effect upon their countries. 44
2. Agreed Statement D
Proponents of the Reinterpretation rely heavily upon Agreed State-
ment D45 and the Treaty's classified negotiating record" surrounding
the insertion of this statement to support their position. Their ra-
tionale in this regard is based upon the fact that the phrase "other
physical principles" appears only in Agreed Statement D. 47 They
assert that the phrase is used in reference to technologies which did
not exist at the time the Treaty was signed. 4 As such, this statement
was specifically inserted in the Treaty for the purpose of regulating
"texotic" systems. 49
This argument is based upon those proponents' assertion that the
definition of ABM systems found in Article II(1) applies only to
those systems existing in 1972.50 Under the Reinterpretation's reading
of this statement, if an ABM system were created in the future based
upon technologies not existing in 1972, it would not be subject to
the restriction imposed by Article V.
This reading, which would permit development and testing of SDI,
is also based upon the assumption that because the statement used
only the word "deploy" and was silent with regard to "development
and testing," the statement was intended to permit more than mere.
research on "exotic" systems. The use of the word "created" in
44. See infra notes 134-44 and accompanying text.
45. See supra note 9 for text of Agreed Statement D.
46. The negotiating record for the Treaty is classified, as are negotiating
records for most treaties. Sofaer Commentary, supra note 8, at 1978. There is some
controversy over Judge Sofaer's use of the negotiating record. Professors Chayes
argue that use of the classified negotiating record violates issues of principle. The
professors assert that because the Senate has not been given access to the record,
any interpretation must be based upon the public record and the text of the Treaty.
Chayes Commentary, supra note 6, at 1968. Professors Chayes also argue that Judge
Sofaer's reading of the negotiating records is questionable given contemporaneous
statements and recollections of participants in the process. Id. at 1966.




50. See supra notes 32-35 and accompanying text.
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Agreed Statement D has been read by proponents of the Reinterpre-
tation to permit development and testing of "exotics". 1
Advocates of the Traditional Interpretation argue that Agreed
Statement D was intended to regulate fixed land-based ABM systems
only.52 This argument is bolstered by testimony by Gerard C. Smith,
the former Chief of the United States delegation which negotiated
the Treaty. Mr. Smith has insisted that Agreed Statement D was
intended to be applied only to the fixed land-based systems.53
In order to support this argument, proponents of the Traditional
Interpretation point to the use in Agreed Statement D of the phrase
"to insure the fulfillment of the obligation not to deploy ABM
systems ... except as provided in Article III of the Treaty."5 4 Because
Article III is the provision limiting fixed land-based systems, it is
argued that Agreed Statement D must be read only with reference
to Article III and its purposes.55
Judge Sofaer's reference to the classified negotiating record lead
him to conclude that Agreed Statement D was intended to permit
the development and testing of futuristic systems.5 6 Judge Sofaer
asserts that the American delegation was unsuccessful in inserting
language in the body of the Treaty limiting "devices" based on
future applications of other physical principles." 5 7 According to
Sofaer, the Soviets were unwilling to commit themselves to unknown
devices or technologies.5 s Sofaer also states that the most that the
Soviets were willing to do was to agree to an appended statement
prohibiting only the deployment of systems based on such technol-
ogies.59
In his analysis on this subject, Judge Sofaer is turning semantical
somersaults. He argues that because the United States could not
51. Nitze Article, supra note 11, at 2; Sofaer Commentary, supra note 8, at
1975 and 1977.
52. Chayes Commentary, supra note 6, at 1962.
53. See 1985 Interpretation Dispute Hearing, supra note 2, at 26 and 29
(statements of Gerard C. Smith). Speaking of Agreed Statement D, Mr. Smith said,
"[it was addressed to one option which the Joint Chiefs stressed we should get
preserved for them; that is, fixed land-based systems, nothing else." Id. at 26. This
statement refutes the contention of advocates of the Reinterpretation that Agreed
Statement D applies to space-based systems.
54. Chayes Commentary, supra note 6, at 1962.
55. Id.
56. Sofaer Commentary, supra note 8, at 1978-80.
57. Id. at 1980.
58. Id. at 1979.
59. Id.
19881
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convince the Soviets to agree to a prohibition against development
and testing of future mobile "devices" based on other physical
principles, the United States is free to disregard the clear language
of Article V and develop "devices" of their own. This is stretching
logic to the breaking point.
John B. Rhinelander, who served as legal advisor to the United
States ABM Treaty delegation, contradicts Judge Sofaer's reading of
the negotiating recordA0 Mr. Rhinelander states that Agreed State-
ment D was inserted following the text of the Treaty for the specific
purpose of interpreting Article 111.61 He has stressed that the statement
was always understood by the United States to apply to Article III
and that the statement did not "diminish or amend" Article V. 62
B. The Soviet View of the Treaty
Following the signing of the ABM Treaty in 1972, the Soviet
leadership perceived it as being "an important step toward imparting
a more stable character to Soviet-American relations, a step toward
building these relations on a firmer foundation. "63 More recently,
Secretary Gorbachev has affirmed that, given the impending reduction
in medium range missiles required by the INF Treaty, the ABM
Treaty has acquired an even more important role in United States-
Soviet Union relationsA*
How have the Soviets interpreted the ABM Treaty? There are those
who argue that Soviet statements and conduct following 1972 evinced
a showing that the "broad" interpretation (the Reinterpretation) was
the Soviet interpretation of the Treaty.6 These commentators argue
60. See 1985 Interpretation Dispute Hearing, supra note 2, at 71-73.
61. Id. at 73.
62. Id. Mr. Rhinelander's statement is supported by testimony at the same
hearing by Ralph Earle, former Director of the United States Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency. Mr. Earle testified that for purposes of interpreting the Treaty
there was no need to look beyond Article V. According to Mr. Earle, Article V is
the "determinative" provision of the Treaty. Id. at 51.
63. Statement by V.V. Kuznetsov, then U.S.S.R. First Deputy Minister of
Foreign Affairs, in Izvestia Aug. 24, 1972, translated in 24 Current Digest of the
Soviet Press, No. 34, 7 (Sept. 20, 1972).
64. 38 Current Digest of the Soviet Press, No. 42, 13 (1986). Mr Gorbachev
stated that if the reductions envisioned by the INF Treaty are to occur, both
countries should be confident that neither "will create new systems that would
undermine stability and parity." Id. At the time Mr. Gorbachev made this statement
the framework for the INF Treaty had just been proposed during the October, 1986
Reykjavik summit between President Reagan and Mr. Gorbachev.
65. See Perle, The Political Trials of SDI, U.S. News and World Report
(Sept. 14, 1987) reprinted in 133 Cong. Rec. No. 143, E3616 (Sept. 21, 1987).
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that the Soviets only began to espouse the Traditional Interpretation
following President Reagan's announcement of SDI. 66
A widely quoted statement by Soviet Defense Minister Marshal
Grechko before the Presidium in 1972 is apparently the only public
Soviet statement at the time on the scope of the Treaty as it related
to research and development. Speaking of the Treaty, Marshal Grechko
stated that "it places no limitations whatsoever on the conducting
of research and experimental work directed toward solving the prob-
lem of defending the country from nuclear missile strikes.' '67 Al-
though this statement does not specifically address future systems, it
is noteworthy because it parallels the traditional view that unlimited
research on ABM systems is permitted.68
Later statements, especially by Mr. Gorbachev and by Marshal
Akhromeyev, the USSR First Deputy Minister of Defense, present
the Soviet interpretation of the Treaty. Marshal Akhromeyev, in a
statement made prior to the Reagan administration's announcement
of the Reinterpretation, detailed a view of the Treaty which closely
follows the Traditional Interpretation .69 Marshal Akhromeyev reaf-
firmed Article V's prohibition against development, testing, and
deployment of space-based ABM systems and components. 70 He also
stressed that the Article II definition of ABM systems was a func-
tional definition. 71 Furthermore, he asserted that Agreed Statement
D was intended to apply to Article III fixed land-based systems.
7 2
Marshal Akhromeyev attacked the scope of SDI as "research
work." He asserted that the ultimate aim of the research on SDI is
focused on advanced testing and development of the systems con-
tained in SDI.
73
Mr. Gorbachev's view of the Treaty, as evidenced by his proposals
at the Reykjavik summit and by his statements following the summit,
66. Id. at E3617.
67. 24 Current Digest of the Soviet Press, No. 39, 25 (Oct. 25, 1972).
68. See Nunn Report, supra note 7, at S2973-74.
69. 37 Current Digest of the Soviet Press, No. 221 (June 26, 1985).
70. Id. at 3.
71. Id. at 3-4. In the parlance of the interpretation dispute, a "functional
definition" means that the Treaty identifies and defines ABM systems in terms of
their performance, i.e., devices which "launch," "intercept," and "detect." See
supra notes 27-29 and accompanying text. See also Sherr Analysis, supra note 7, at
6.
72. 37 Current Digest of the Soviet Press, No. 22, at 4.
73. Id. at 3. In this regard, Marshal Akhromeyev states, "[t]he ABM Treaty
(Art. V) prohibits the development and testing of space-based ABM systems or
components-i.e., just what the US's "inoffensive research' is aimed at." Id.
1988] 687
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indicate that the Soviets want to limit United States research on
SDI.74 At the summit, Mr. Gorbachev proposed that both sides
commit not to withdraw from the Treaty for ten years and that
research and testing on new systems be limited to a laboratory
framework during-that ten-year period.
7 5
This limitation on research to laboratory setting is a variation on
the Traditional Interpretation which generally maintains that the
Article V prohibitions do not apply to "basic and advanced research
and exploratory development. ' 76 United States Secretary of State
George Schultz argues that this effort by Mr. Gorbachev to limit
research to laboratory settings amounts to an attempt to amend the
Treaty.77
There have been reports in the United States media that, in
anticipation of the December 1987 Reagan-Gorbachev summit, the
Soviets were softening their view of SDI.7 8 In announcing that Mr.
Gorbachev would be coming to Washington for the summit, Edward
A. Shevardnadze, the Soviet Foreign Minister, stated: "[w]e believe
that the ABM Treaty should be observed as signed and ratified. '79
This may be seen as a retreat by the Soviets from Mr. Gorbachev's
calling for limited research on ABM systems. However, it is arguably
a showing that the Soviets want both countries to follow the Tradi-
tional Interpretation.
II. INTERNATIONAL LAW AND TREATY INTERPRETATION PRINCIPLES
The foregoing discussion may lead one to question whether there
are accepted tenets as to how a treaty should be read and interpreted.
Quite to the contrary, there is an international public document, the
74. 37 Current Digest of the Soviet Press, No. 41, 4 (Nov. 12, 1986).
75. Id. At his press conference following the Reykjavik summit, Mr. Gor-
bachev stated that a "real skirmish" between President Reagan and himself resulted
from the President's insistence upon testing SDI in space. Id.
76. Nunn Report, supra note 7, at S2977. The lines between "research,"
"exploratory development," and "development" are extremely blurred. "Develop-
ment" apparently starts with "field testing" on a "prototype" of an ABM com-
ponent. Sherr Analysis, supra note 7, at 12. Presumably, "exploratory development"
would be work on a prototype in a laboratory or "non-field" setting.
77. Schultz Report, supra note 11, at 2. It is somewhat ironic that Secretary
Schultz is quick to label the Gorbachev proposal as an amendment to the Treaty,
when the Reagan administration seems determined to subterfuge the intent of the
Treaty.
78. See Gordon, Shift By Soviets Toward Subtlety on Arms Foreseen, N.Y.
Times, Nov. 1, 1987, at Al, col. 6.
79. Id. at A12, col. 6.
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Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties [hereinafter "Vienna
Convention", 0 as well as several respected authorities"1 which pro-
vide guidance on interpretation principles. This section of the com-
ment will analyze the ABM Treaty dispute in light of the Vienna
Convention and the international authorities. In addition, this section
will discuss the international law principle of rebus sic stantibus
82
which is suggested as a basis for repudiation of the Treaty by the
United States. 3
A. The Vienna Convention and Other International Authorities
Part III, Section 3 of the Vienna Convention sets forth the inter-
national rules for interpretation of treaties. Article 31 of the Con-
vention contains the "General rule of interpretation."
4
80. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties was signed by the United
States in 1970, but has never been ratified by the United States Senate. Nunn
Report, supra note 7, at S2982 n.12.
81. See Lord McNair, Law of Treaties (1961); McDougal, Lasswell and Miller,
Interpretation of Agreements and World Public Order (1967); and Fitzmaurice, Vae
Victis of Woe to Negotiations! Your Treaty or Our "Interpretation" of It? 65 AM.
J. INT'L. L. 358 (1971).
82. The doctrine of rebus sic stantibus permits a party to terminate or
withdraw from a treaty where a fundamental change of circumstances has occurred
since the treaty was signed and the existence of those circumstances was a funda-
mental basis for the agreement between the parties. See Article 62 of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, infra note 113.
83. Gallagher, Legal Aspects of the Strategic Defense Initiative, 111 Mnm. L.
REv. 11, 30-31 (1986).
84. Article 31 of the Vienna Convention provides:
General Rule of Interpretation
1. A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary
meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the
light of its object and purpose.
2. The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall comprise,
in addition to the text, including its preamble and annexes:
(a) any agreement relating to the treaty which was made between all the parties
in connection with the conclusion of the treaty;
(b) any instrument which was made by one or more parties in connection with
the conclusion of the treaty and accepted by the other parties as an instrument
related to the treaty.
3. There shall be taken into account, together with the context:
(a) any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation
of the treaty or the application of its provisions;
(b) any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes
the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation;
(c) any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between
the parties.
4. A special meaning shall be given to a term if it is established that the
parties so intended.
Sweeney, Oliver, and Leach, The International Legal System, Cases and Materials
194, 203-04 (2d ed. Supp. 1981).
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Article 31 contains the principle that the language of -a treaty is
of utmost importance and is to be read in light of the treaty's
purpose and object."5 Toward this end, a treaty should be interpreted
with a focus on the general purpose which the parties intended the
treaty to serve.
8 6
In this regard, Article I of the ABM Treaty provides insight into
the intended purpose of the parties."7 Article I(1) states the general
purpose of the Treaty-that the parties intended to limit the use and
proliferation of ABM systems. If the reading advocated by the
Reinterpretation were followed, the opposite would result. Each side
would have greater latitude to develop ABM systems if a broad
reading of the Treaty were permitted. There would then be the
enhanced possibility of an escalation of the arms race.
Article 31(3)(b) of the Vienna Convention contains language which
permits the "subsequent practice" of parties to be taken into account
when interpreting a treaty.8 As Senator Nunn points out, this pro-
vision is a codification of the customary international law principle
of "practice of states." 8 9 'Aihe principle is germane to the ABM Treaty
dispute. Because the United States followed the Traditional Interpre-
tation for thirteen years following the signing of the Treaty and set
its policies around that interpretation, this conduct is highly probative
of the interpretation which the parties attached to the Treaty.9°
When an interpretation pursuant to Article 31 of the Vienna
Convention produces an ambiguous or obscure meaning or an absurd
or unreasonable result, secondary means of interpretation are avail-
able. Article 32 of the Vienna Convention permits recourse to the
85. Nunn Report, supra note 7, at 2976 (citing The Law of Treaties, supra
note 81, at 380-81 (1961)).
86. The Law of Treaties, supra note 81, at 380.
87. ABM Treaty, supra note 1, art. I, 23 U.S.T., at 3438, T.I.A.S. No.
7503, at 4.
88. See supra note 84.
89. Nunn Report, supra note 7, at S2976. The principle of "practice of
states" embodies the notion that the conduct of the parties to a treaty may be
dispositive in treaty interpretation disputes. The manner in which the parties imple-
ment a treaty may be indicative of their intentions. The Law of Treaties, supra note
81, at 424 (citing Article 19 of the Harvard Research Draft Convention).
90. Richard Perle has made a similar, but reversed argument following the
"practice of state" doctrine. Mr. Perle asserts that Soviet statements prior to 1983
and the Soviet research and development program on future ABM systems evinces
conduct that is indicative of the Reinterpretation. Perle, The Political Trials of SDI,
supra note 63, at E3617.
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preparatory work of the treaty under such circumstances. 9' Each
side of the ABM Treaty dispute points to Article 32 of the Vienna
Convention to support its position. Proponents of the Traditional
Interpretation point out that the language of the Treaty itself is clear
and unambiguous, so that there is no need to resort to the negotiation
record to clarify the Treaty's meaning. 92 Advocates of the Reinter-
pretation argue that the existence of Agreed Statement D creates the
requisite ambiguity to justify use of the negotiation record. 93
This split between the two sides of the dispute is fairly indicative
of the differences between the international authorities on recourse
to references outside the face of a treaty. The Vienna Convention's
reliance upon a treaty's text as the primary source of interpretation
reflects the customary rule of international law. 94 Under the inter-
national view, the treaty's text is given preference over extrinsic
information, such as the negotiation record, because in many cases
negotiation records have been found to be misleading or incomplete. 9
Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, a judge on the International Court of
Justice and a leader of the international view, cautions against
straying too far away from the text of a treaty. 96 He implies that if
a treaty is given too broad a reading by disregarding the text, the
parties may find themselves burdened with an obligation they never
intended. 97 Under such circumstances, parties to a treaty could never
be certain how their treaty would be applied. 9
91. Article 32 of the Vienna Convention provides:
Supplementary means of interpretation
Recourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation, including
the preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion, in
order to confirm the meaning resulting from the application of Article 31, or
to determine the meaning when the interpretation according to Article 31:
(a) leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure; or
(b) leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable.
Sweeney, Oliver and Leach, supra note 84, at 204.
92. Sherr Analysis, supra note 7, at 9 and n. 11; Nunn Report, supra note 7,
at S2976.
93. Sofaer Commentary, supra note 8, at 1978.
94. Reports of the International Law Commission, 61 AM. J. INT'L. L. 248,
348-61 (1967). The Commission's report, which discusses the draft version of the
Vienna Convention, refers to the rules of interpretation as Articles 27 and 28. These
two articles are identical to Articles 31 and 32 of the final version of the Vienna
Convention.
95. Id. at 354.




DUQUESNE LA W REVIEW
The Reinterpretation's easy reliance upon the negotiation record is
illustrative of the American view of treaty interpretation. This view
is espoused by Professor Myres S. McDougal. 99 Under this line of
thinking, resorting to extrinsics, including the travaux preparatories,
is not only permissible, but is often required to decipher the meaning
of treaty language.1°° According to this view, the intention of the
parties may not be ascertainable by reference solely to the treaty's
text.'
0'
Given this background, it is not surprising that advocates of the
Reinterpretation resort to the negotiation record to establish the
validity of its position. It is unlikely a coincidence that Professor
McDougal labels the Vienna Convention approach as "restrictive,"1 0 2
a designation which the Reagan administration attributes to the
Traditional Interpretation.
B. Rebus Sic Statibus
A recurring theme found as justification for the Reinterpretation
and for questioning the validity of the ABM Treaty is the notion
that circumstances between the United States and the Soviet Union
have changed since the Treaty was signed in 1972. Judge Sofaer lists
Soviet violations of the Treaty,03 the implementation of SDI, and
the ongoing arms negotiations at Geneva as justifications for the
Reinterpretation.' 4 President Reagan has said that the underlying
philosophical basis for the Treaty, the policy of "mutual assured
99. See McDougal, The International Law Commission's Draft Articles Upon
Interpretation: Textuality Redivivus, 61 AM. J. INT'L. L. 992 (1967).
100. Id. at 997.
101. Id. at 995. Professor McDougal states that even with the use of the
travaux preparatoires it is often difficult to decipher the parties' intentions. Id.
102. Id. at 998-99.
103. The public debate continuously points to the construction by the Soviets
of a giant radar system at Krasnoyarsk as a violation of the Treaty. Generally, both
sides of the dispute here in the United States agree that this radar system violates
the Treaty. See, e.g., Nunn Report, supra note 7, at S2968, and Report on Reykjavik,
supra note 10, at 1. The Soviets, however, assert that the Krasnoyarsk radar system
is not a treaty violation. See 22 Current Digest of the Soviet Press, No. 37, 4 (June
26, 1985) (statement by Marshal Akhromeyev).
President Reagan has repeatedly used the Krasnoyarsk radar as justification for
proceeding with SDI. See Reagan Renews Star Wars Pitch, Pittsburgh Post Gazette,
Nov: 25, 1987, at A2, col. 2. See also Report on Reykjavik, supra note 10, at 1.
104. 1985 Interpretation Dispute Hearing, supra note 2, at 9 (statement by
Abraham D. Sofaer).
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destruction,"' 105 is "uncivilized" and, therefore, a strong defense
system such as SDI is necessary. 1°6 Former Secretary of Defense
Caspar W. Weinberger declared that continued work by the Soviets
in the field of strategic defense and the Soviet advantage in strategic
offensive weapons were grounds for repudiation of the Treaty.'0 7
The implied message in these assertions is that the ABM Treaty,
or at least the traditional interpretation of the Treaty, needs to be
replaced. Although the Treaty is of unlimited duration, 08 either
country may withdraw upon six months notice if "it decides that
extraordinary events related to the subject matter of this Treaty have
jeopardized its supreme interests."' 19 One commentator has concluded
that if the United States chose to withdraw for the reasons stated by
former Secretary of Defense Weinberger," ° its actions would be
lawful under the principle of rebus sic statibus."'
The principle of rebus sic statibus is recognized in international
law and by domestic courts."' It is codified in Article 62 of the
Vienna Convention."3 This principle permits one party to withdraw
105. "Mutual assured destruction" (MAD) can best be described as a deterrent.
Both the United States and U.S.S.R. were aware that they possessed sufficient
nuclear weapons to totally annihilate each other. The potential for instant retaliation
was viewed as a deterrent for either country making the first strike. For this theory
to work, defense systems were kept to a minimum so that neither country would
have the capability of intercepting the other's offensive attack. As a result, the
number of ABM systems permitted under the Treaty was limited to one for each
country. See Stein, From H-Bombs to Star Wars, 53 (1984).
106. Report on Reykjavik, supra note 10, at 1.
107. Gallagher, supra note 83, at 29. Mr. Weinberger went so far as to
wonder, "Do we want to let that kind of treaty stand in the way of our ability to
develop a thoroughly reliable system of defense which can render their nuclear
missiles impotent? And my answer to that would be very simple." Id. Such public
utterances can do very little to bolster international confidence in the United State's
intention to stand behind its treaty obligations.
108. ABM Treaty, supra note 1, art. XV(1), 23 U.S.T., at 3446, T.I.A.S. No.
7503, at 12.
109. Id. art. XV(2).
110. See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
111. Gallagher, supra note 83, at 30-31.
112. Reports of the International Law Commissions, 61 AM. J. INT'L. L. 248,
428-29 (1967).
113. Article 62 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties provides:
Fundamental change of circumstances
1. A fundamental change of circumstances which has occurred with regard to
those existing at the time of the conclusion of a treaty, and which was not
foreseen by the parties, may not be invoked as a ground for terminating or
withdrawing from the treaty unless:
(a) the existence of those circumstances constituted an essential basis of the
1988]
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from a treaty when a fundamental change of circumstances has
occurred which makes performance of the treaty impossible. 14 How-
ever, its scope is limited and it is invoked only under strict circum-
stances to preserve the integrity and security of treaties." 5
The International Law Commission [hereinafter "Commission"]
in its commentary following the draft version of Article 62 of the
Vienna Convention, 116 states that courts which have discussed the
principle advance the proposition that its use is limited to changes
in circumstances the continuance of which was regarded by the parties
as a tacit condition of the treaty." 7 To put this notion in a contract
law framework, the agreement would be terminable where a failure
of consideration has occurred."
8
The best application of the principle, according to the Commission,
is to a treaty of unlimited duration, which contains no provision for
termination, in which the parties gave no consideration to a change
of circumstances." 19 In addition, the principle may not be invoked
where the change of circumstances is foreseen by the parties.
20
In reviewing the terms of the ABM Treaty, it is clear the invocation
of the principle of rebus sic statibus by the United States would be
consent of the parties to be bound by the treaty; and
(b) the effect of the change is radically to transform the extent of obligations
still to be performed under the treaty.
2. A fundamental change of circumstances may not be invoked as a ground
for terminating or withdrawing from a treaty:
(a) if the treaty establishes a boundary; or
(b) if the fundamental change is the result of a breach by the party invoking
it either of an obligation under the treaty or of any other international
obligation owed to any other party to the treaty.
3. If, under the foregoing paragraphs, a party may invoke a fundamental
change of circumstances as a ground for terminating or withdrawing from a
treaty it may also invoke the change as a ground for suspending the operation
of the treaty.
Sweeney, Oliver, and Leach, supra note 84, at 212.
The International Law Commission chose to not use the term "rebus sic
statibus" in reference to Article 62 so as to avoid the "doctrinal implications of
that term". Reports of the International Law Commission, supra note 112, at 432.
114. Id. at 428.
115. Id.
116. Id. The article discussed in the commentary is labeled as Article 59.
However, Article 62 contains language identical to that in the article discussed by
the Commission, with the exception of the existence of paragraph (3).
117. Id. at 429. See cases cited by the Commission in its report in n. 253.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 431-32.
120. Id. at 433.
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inappropriate. Article XV(2) of the Treaty 21 permits either party to
withdraw upon six months notice where "extraordinary events" affect
that party's supreme interest. Furthermore, Article XIV permits each
party to propose amendments and Article XIII provides for a Stand-
ing Consultative Commission whose function is to consider ambi-
guities and changes in the "strategic situation."1 22 These provisions
indicate that the parties reasonably foresaw that changes in circum-
stances would occur and provided means of addressing such changes.
The validity of the termination provisions in Article XV(2) is not
disputed. The issue is whether the development of SDI constitutes
an "extraordinary event" which justifies termination of the Treaty
by the United States. SDI development would certainly be classified
as such an event by the United States, but whose standards are to
be followed?
In discussing China's attempted repudiation of the Sino-Belgian
Treaty of 1865, the Permanent Court of International Justice sug-
gested that denunciation of a treaty without the consent of the other
party is extreme. 23 The proper course would be for the parties to
first seek to revise the treaty via negotiation and to then seek a
decision of the International Court.124
The framework for negotiation is certainly present, given the on-
going negotiations in Geneva between the United States and the
Soviet Union. To date, however, President Reagan has refused to
make SDI a "bargaining chip" in negotiations.1
25
III. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE SENATE AND THE PRESIDENT
IN THE INTERPRETATION DISPUTE
In his report on the interpretation dispute to the Senate, Senator
Sam Nunn characterized the Reagan administration's Reinterpretation
as "a fundamental constitutional challenge to the Senate."' 126 This
121. See supra notes 108-09 and accompanying text.
122. ABM Treaty, supra note 1, articles XIII and XIV. Ironically, amidst all
of the rhetoric found in the ongoing dispute, there is no indication that either nation
has sought to resolve its difference through the vehicle specifically designed for
problem resolution-the Standing Consultative Committee provided for in article
XIII.
123. See Reports of International Law Commission supra note 112, at 430
(citing P.C.I.J. (Ser. C) No. 16, I, p.5 2).
124. Id.
125. Smith, U.S. Stance on SDI Reviewed, Washington Post, Nov. 29, 1987,
at Al, col. 6.
126. Nunn Report, supra note 7, at S2967.
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position is in response to the administration's assertion that testimony
by officials of the Nixon administration during the ABM Treaty
ratification process provides no basis for establishing either parties'
obligations under the Treaty.'
27
The underlying premise for Senator Nunn's position is found in
the fact that the Senate, pursuant to article II, section 2 of the
Constitution, must give its advice and consent by a two-thirds vote
to any treaty negotiated by the President. 1 Senator Nunn's argument
is that since the Senate ratified the Treaty in 1972 based upon the
Traditional Interpretation, 2 9 the Senate's consent is required if the
Reagan administration wishes to implement the Reinterpretation. 30
Senator Nunn also argues that if the classified negotiation record
does support the Reinterpretation, the Nixon administration signed
one treaty with the Soviets and the Senate ratified a "different"
treaty based on the Traditional Interpretation.' The constitutional
conflict inherent in such a scenario is that the Reagan administration
would place itself in the position of choosing between its obligations
to the Senate and its "contract" with the Soviets.'32 The administra-
tion's choosing to honor the separate contract with the Soviets in
derogation of the treaty ratified by the Senate would have the effect
of cutting the Senate out of the treaty ratification process.'
However, the administration's assertion that testimony by officials
of the Nixon administration was not sufficient to establish either
party's obligation under the Treaty is misplaced. Under the precepts
of international law, statements by high-ranking officials have been
sufficient to bind a country to the obligations created by those
statements. 1
3 4
In this regard, two international law case decisions are illuminating.
In the Eastern Greenland case (Denmark v. Norway),'35 a dispute
127. Id.
128. See generally id. at S2981-82.
129. See supra note 42.
130. Toward this end Senator Nunn, along with Senator Levin, has introduced
a resolution to the Senate which would require President Reagan to seek Senate
consent before implementing the Reinterpretation. See supra note 17 and accom-
panying text.
131. Nunn Report, supra note 7, at S2982.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. See generally Glennon, The Senate Role in Treaty Ratification, 77 AM.
J. INT'L. L. 267-78 (1983) [hereinafter Glennon Article].
135. Sweeney, Oliver and Leach, The International Legal System, Cases and
Materials (2d ed. 1981) 956 (citing P.C.I.J. (Ser. A/B) No. 53 (1953)).
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arose over the issue of Denmark's claim of sovereignty to certain
territories in Eastern Greenland. In that case, the Permanent Court
of International Justice held that a declaration by the Norwegian
Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Danish Minister was sufficient to
obligate Norway to refrain from occupying and from contesting
Denmark's sovereignty over the territories. 13 6 The court stated that a
response by a government representative to a request by a diplomatic
official of another country was binding upon the country to which
that representative belonged, when the matter was within the domain
of that representative. 1
3 7
In the second case, the Nuclear Test cases (Australia v. France)'38
a communique by the President of France was deemed to be legally
binding to prohibit France from conducting atmospheric tests of
nuclear weapons in the South Pacific. 13 9 The French communique
stated that France would be ready to begin underground testing once
it completed a series of atmospheric tests.'4°
One commentator who recently discussed the impact of these
decisions wondered whether a statement by President Reagan could
bind the United States from taking any actions from undercutting
United States-Soviet treaties.' 4' As related to the interpretation
dispute, one can also wonder whether the principles of these decisions
apply to the testimony of Nixon administration officials at the treaty
ratification hearings.
The one declaration to which this principle most aptly applies is
the statement of then Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird. 142 Secretary
Laird's written reply to a question by Senator Barry Goldwater set
forth the Traditional Interpretation of the ABM Treaty. Because of
this statement, Senator Nunn argues that several powerful and influ-
ential Senators understood that they were ratifying the Treaty based
upon the Traditional Interpretation.143
136. Id. at 958. The declaration by the Norwegian Minister was, in effect,
that the Norwegian Government would "not make any problems" in the resolution
of the dispute between the two countries. Id. at 957.
137. Id. at 958.
138. Id. at 278 (citing [1974] I.C.J. 253).
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Glennon Article, supra note 134, at 278. The statement by President
Reagan was: "As for existing agreements [between the U.S. and U.S.S.R.], we will
refrain from actions which undercut them so long as the Soviet Union shows equal
restraint." Id. at 272.
142. See supra notes 41 and 42 and accompanying test.
143. Nunn Report, supra note 7, at S2982, and see supra note 42.
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Can the formal written declaration by former Secretary of Defense
Laird bind the Reagan administration under international law to the
Traditional Interpretation? The written statement was delivered in a
setting in which the meaning of the Treaty was being explained to
the Senate. The statement was delivered in response to a question
on the applicability of the Treaty to future technologies. Furthermore,
the subject matter of the response was within the province of the
former Secretary of Defense's responsibility in the government, so
as to bring the response within the test of the Eastern Greenland
case.'" Under these circumstances it is reasonable to conclude that
the Laird declaration was sufficient to bind the Nixon administration
to the Senate as well as to the Soviet Union on the Traditional
Interpretation. The Laird declaration is likewise binding against Pres-
ident Reagan, who inherited the obligations of the ABM Treaty when
he took office.
The other constitutional issue presented by Senator Nunn's state-
ment to the Senate 45 is whether the Senate's consent is needed if the
Reagan administration attempts to implement the Reinterpretation.
It is recognized that the Senate has the authority to attach conditions
upon its ratification of a treaty.'l" In the case of the ABM Treaty,
the Senate attached no such condition or understanding that its
consent was required to any amendments or termination of the
Treaty.147 Had the Senate so conditioned its consent to the Treaty,
it is clear that the administration would be required to seek Senate
approval to implement the Reinterpretation.
Based upon the manner in which Senator Nunn phrases his dis-
cussion on this issue, 148 he appears to be asserting that implementation
144. See supra notes 135-37 and accompanying test.
145. See supra notes 126-28 and accompanying text.
146. Glennon Article, supra note 134, at 258.
147. In his report, Senator Nunn points out that ratification with an incor-
poration of conditions is generally avoided because such a practice would unduly
burden a treaty. In addition, he states that the wide employment of such a practice
would make it very difficult for a country to participate in multilateral agreements.
Nunn Report, supra note 7, at S2982.
For an example of an instance where the Senate attached a condition to its
approval of the Spanish Bases Treaty and the conflict which ensured, see Glennon
Article, supra note 134, at 258-59.
148. Senator Nunn states: "If the negotiating record and evidence of the
subsequent practices of the United States and the Soviet Union establish a conclusive
basis for the Reinterpretation, this would mean that the Nixon administration signed
one treaty with the Soviets and the Senate ratified a different contract." Nunn
Report, supra note 7, at S2982.
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of the Reinterpretation would amount to a termination of the Treaty
ratified by the Senate. Under this reasoning, a reinterpreted ABM
Treaty would be a "different" treaty than the one ratified by the
Senate. 149 This then presents the question of whether the President
has the constitutional authority to terminate a treaty without the
consent of the Senate. Such a question was presented in Goldwater
v. Carter,150 wherein a group of senators challenged President Carter's
authority to unilaterally abrogate the mutual defense treaty with
Taiwan. Unfortunately, the United States Supreme Court did not
reach that constitutional question in the case."' However, Mr. Justice
Powell, in a concurring opinion, acknowledged that there was room
for dispute between the Executive and Legislative Branches on this
question. 52 Mr. Justice Powell implied that if the Senate asserted
itself through some official action and challenged the President's
decision to terminate the Taiwanese Treaty, a justiciable dispute
would exist.'53
The rationale of Mr. Justice Powell's opinion appears to be guiding
the Senate in the ABM Treaty dispute. Resolutions have been intro-
duced into the Senate which, if passed, would require the Senate to
approve any change in the interpretation of the Treaty.l4 In addition,
149. Id.
150. Goldwater v. Carter, 481 F. Supp. 949, rev'd, 617 F.2d 697, vacated,
444 U.S. 996 (1979).
151. 481 F. Supp. at 949. The United States District Court for the District of
Columbia held that Senate consent was required for termination of a treaty. The
district court's rationale was that treaty termination involved a series of acts requiring
the maintenance of a constitutional balance between the Executive and Legislative
branches. In this regard, the court stated that treaty termination was akin to treaty
ratification, which required the advice and consent of the Senate. Id.
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
reversed, holding that the power to terminate a treaty was within the President's
exclusive "foreign affairs power." 617 F.2d at 705-07. The court of appeals stated
that the Senate's express power in the area of treaties, as defined by article II,
section 2 of the Constitution, was limited to ratification. The court was unwilling
to find any implied power for the Senate in the realm of treaty termination. The
United States Supreme Court issued an order vacating the court of appeals decision
and directing the district court to dismiss the complaint. 444 U.S. at 996. Mr. Justice
Powell in a concurring opinion stated that the issue was not ripe for judicial review
Id. Mr. Justice Rehnquist filed a separate concurring opinion in which he stated
that the case involved a "political" question and thus was non-justiciable. Id.
152. See 444 U.S. at 997-1002.
153. Id. at 997-98. Justices Blackmun and White, in a dissenting statement,
argue that a substantial and justiciable issue was indeed present in the case. Id. at
1006.
154. See supra notes 17 and 130 and accompanying texts.
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as part of the recent budget appropriation process, the Senate reached
an agreement with the Reagan administration, whereby the admin-
istration would not seek to implement the Reinterpretation through
September 1988.155
As a result, the Senate has taken the formal official action nec-
essary to protect its position in the treaty-making process. If the
interpretation dispute goes any further and the Reagan administra-
tion, or its successor, attempts to implement the Reinterpretation,
the judicial table could be set for the constitutional conflict discussed
by Senator Nunn.
CONCLUSIONS
In an international dispute such as the ABM Treaty dispute, which
encompasses principles of treaty interpretation, arms control, and
constitutional precepts, there can be no easy answers. The great
weight of authority rests with those who espouse the Traditional
Interpretation, given the statements of those intimately involved in
negotiating the Treaty. Proponents of the Reinterpretation counter
with the literal "ace in the hole"-the classified negotiations record.
Might not both nations be best served by observation of the very
language and purposes of the Treaty which they continue to dispute?
The Preamble and Article I of the Treaty address the basic tenets
which the two countries sought to achieve by this undertaking. Both
nations recognized that by limiting the development of anti-ballistic
missile systems, they would be taking a giant step toward curbing
the deadly spiral of the arms race.
One must wonder whether the overall purpose and objectives of
the Treaty are truly being served by the Reinterpretation's efforts to
find a loophole to the Treaty. Furthermore, the Reagan administra-
tion should consider whether its dream of a space-based shield is
worth the legacy of having devised a way of circumventing our treaty
obligations.
By looking to the face of the Treaty, one finds an avenue con-
structed specifically for resolving disputes of this nature. When the
Treaty was negotiated, both nations saw fit to provide for a Standing
Consultative Committee. 15 6 The committee was to assist in promoting
the objectives of the Treaty.. Surely, a question over the Treaty's
155. Gordon, Congress Reaches Arms Compromise with White House, N.Y.
Times, Nov. 18, 1987, at Al, col. 1.
156. See ABM Treaty, supra note 1, Art. XII.
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intended meaning and coverage is one within the bailiwick of this
committee. If ever there was a dispute ripe for consideration by the
committee, the ABM Treaty interpretation dispute is it.
Chester J. Karas, Jr.

